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THE ARMED SERVICES AND THEIR NEEDS - III

Mr. President:
President Eisenhower has sent to Congress a record-breaking peacetime
Budget.

The largest portion of the Administratienls program for Fiscal Year 1959

is for an expanded and accelerated defense effort. World events have spurred the
United States on to new achievements in weapons, missiles and rocket technology;
a prerequisite to the maintenance

~f

our position as a world power,

Vast sums of money have been spent and much more will be expended in
years to come for an ever-improving arsenal of weapons and equipment for the Armed
Forces.
f~r

As the tools of modern defense become more intricate and complex the need

more highly skilled technicians and operators becomes more important,

Contrary

to some beliefs, the human element in defense is now in a position of greater
importance than at any other time in our past history,
The emphasis has now shifted from a preoccupation with numbers

~f

men tu

that of the quality of our men in uniform,
Greater numbers of men will not meet the challenge.

Only marked

increases in the level of competence and experience of the men in the Armed Forces
can provide for the effective, economical operation required by the changing times
and nati onal needs.
Although numerical strength objectives are being met, the Armed Force s
are not able at the present time and under the present circumstances , to attract
and retain the kinds of people needed for the period of time necessary for them ts
make an effective contribution to the operation of the force,

The problem in the

simple st terms is; how do we stop the rapid turnover of military personnel?
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Re~ommendations

were submitted last year to the Secretary of Defense by

Ralph J. Cordiner, Chairman of the Defense Advisory

Co~~ttee

on Professional and

Technical Compensation which would, if put into effect, acquire and
competent personnel required Qy our defense activities.
this

Co~nQttee,

The

reta~n

the
of

recomn1endat~ons

more frequently called the Cordiner Report, have been put into

legislative form in a bill introduced in the Senate Qy the distinguished junior
Senator from Missouri, Mr. Symington, and the distinguished junior Senator from
Arizona, Mr. Goldwater.
In presenting their recommendations, the Committee expressed its belief
based on exhaustive studies that "through modern management of the ma,power in the
armed services, we can simultaneously reduce the cost and increase the effectiveness of the national defense.

The Corrmdttee feels that through the adoptior. of

their program in its entirety it will be possible to attract, retain and motivate
the scientific, professional, technical, combat leadership and management skills
required by the Department of Defense today and in the future.

It is believed the

improvements will be far reaching and long lasting, and will bring in greater
savings and gains with each passing year as the new systems are

instituted~

Such

benefits cannot be achieved by half-measures which adopt the terminology but kill
the substance of the recommendations."
I am in accord with these recommendations and, in my opinion, we will re
derelict in our responsibilities if positive action is not taken during this
session of Congress.
In approaching this problem of military personnel we should consider
two things.

What is the situation today and what can be done about it?

At the present time there are approximately
Navy, Marine Corps and the Air Force.

2.5

million men in the

Army~
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Since 1939 the annual costs of the armed forces have increased approximately 3500 per cent.
According to information I have received from the three services during
Fiscal Year 1956 there was a turnoyer of 1,472,512 military personnel.

These

figures are based upon gross gains ( including reenlistments) and losses.

During

this same year the estimated additiopiL cost of the turnover of personnel in the
Arrrry alone was $1,104,ooo,ooo and .; it i ,s estimated that it will c ost nearly as
much in the current Fiscal Year.
The cost of our defense apparatus is of such magnitude today that it is
unfortunate that billions must be lost each year to the turnover of personnel
because of resignations, retirements, the reduced rate of reenlistments, and then
the induction and training of new officers and enlisted men.

Not only is this a

needless expense, it is lowering the proficiency and capabilities of our military
people when the contrary is so vital in this age of advanced technology.
One of the most disturbing things about this rapid turnover is that
first term reenlistment rates are highest among personnel for whom the training
investment is lowest; conversely, reenlistment rates are lowest where the
training investment is highest.

This is one of the major findings of the Cordiner

Report.
Every time the Air Force loses a B-52 aircraft commander the Federal
Government loses
SF-Ile

$8~9 , 36)

in prerequisite training ar.d flyi ng costs and t his

amount must be invested i n a new B-52 Cl'lmmander.
In 1950 the training of a multiengine airplane pilot was approximately

$34,470. With the more advanced equipment, the training of a
commander costs $401 1 950.
addi tion:ally, ·

B-52 aircraft

This represents the upgrade training only.

prerequisite

And,

flyine costs for each of these officers is in

- 4the area of $407, 410 - a total 0f $809 ,360 .

Simi larly I. am ir.f ormed that in 1950

t he t raining of a single - 8ngine jet pil ot cost $38 , 000 .

In 1957 the training of

·an F - 102 pil ot has cl i mbed to $233 , 930 .
In 1950 the training of a communications officer cost the Air Force
approximately $8,6oo, while in 1956, to train an officer to be a qualified
communications-electronics staff officer, the cost has been established as
$27,470.

In 1957, the Air Force lost l5,hOO officers.

This represents a loss

to the United States of billions of dollars.
The major contributing factors causing this increase are the vastly
increased complexity of the equipment used and the advances in technology.

This

training and equipment is so expensive we cannot afford to waste it.
In the Army the training of a pilot in 1950 cost $7,000 and today it
costs $24,000 to train a fixed wing airplane pilot.

In 1950 it cost $3,716 to

train a microwave radic repairman; today this same training costs $5,076.
While it is easy enough to retain the less skilled in whom the taxpayers
have invested little training money, the electronics maintenance men and operators,
the radar men and the missile men, the aircraft mechanics, the pilots and
navigators -- these men with the key skills of modern defense are leaving the
Armed Forces as fast as they can.
When they go, they not only take with them thousands of dollars worth
of training acquired at the taxpayer's expense, but they leave the Armed Forces
with the frustrating task of starting all over again with raw recruits.
Some turnover is inevitable and desirable.

But the turnover rates that

exist in the critical skills and among the young officers is dru1gerously and
destructively high.

- 5During his testimony before the Senate Armed Services

Committee~

Hr. Cordiner stated that during the course of his ColTIITl:!.ttee's study, they found
out tha·::, 73 percent of the junior officers completing obligatory tours of d"J.ty
during Fiscal Year

4,ooo

1955

promptly returned to civilian life.

pilots left the Armed Forces.

In Fiscal

1955,

This represented a minimwm training loss

alone of $480 million and a severe loss to the country's capacity to respond
immediately and powerfully to an enemy attack.
An important consideration in this high turnover is that it takes
500,000 trainees just to maintain an effective combat force and support service
of 2.3 million.

The more of those 2.3 million trained people we can induce to

r eenlist and develop toward even higher skills and responsibilities, the fewer
trainees we will need to maintain an effective force.
The challenge before us is to build up the reenlistment rates of the
men who have the skills that are most needed, or who have the aptitude to develop
such skillso

These people cannot be retained without offering genuine incentives.

How can we best meet the challenge?
b9 done qy adopting the recommendations of the

I am firmly convinced that this can
Cord~ner

Report.

The Cordiner Report proposes a modernized compensation plan.

Skills,

performance and ir.centi7e would be a major consideration in adjusting the
military pay scale rather than length of service aloneo
The Department of Defense would be given greater flexibility and control
over the distribution of skills and experience in the services and the emphasis
would be placed on quality rather than quantity.
The adoption of the Committee's recommendations would mean a
improvemGnt in the combat capabilities of the k:'med Forces, without a

15

per cent

signif~cant

- 6change in the budget.

After 1962 there would be savings in defense costs of over

$5 billion. Training accidents would be sharply reduced.

It would allow a

reduction in the number of military personnel for national defenseo

And above all,

the adoption of these recommendations would improve the attraction, retention and
motivation of the officers and airmen in the Armed Services.
In addition I feel that there is a great need for additional fringe
benefits such as low-cost insurance, dental care for dependents, commissary and
PX privileges and other inducements which are an attractive consideration to our
military personnel, particularly family men.
When we talk about increased pay, increased benefits we automatically
think about increased costs.

In the area of defense one might feel that the costs

would be staggering but, as a matter of fact, the implementation of the Cordiner
Report would mean savings after the first couple of yearsn
The astounding thing about the proposals recommended in the Cordiner
Report is that it would require only about $6oO million a year ib increased payroll
costs even when the Armed Services have a top strength of 2 0 8

million~

The savings from increased retention would very quickly offset these
added payroll costs, and the second full year of operation would result in net
savings that would increase year after year.

Statistics presented to the Armed

Services Committee indicame that gains would overtake the costs in Fiscal 1960
and that by 1962 the gains would rise to $367 million.
If the entire program is put into effective opergiion, the Department of
Defense has estimated that $5 billion savings can be achieved by Fiscal 1962.
Since the beginning of World War II we have depended upon the draft
as a permanent source of men for the Armed Services. Much of the military manpower is either drafted or influenced by the draft.

I cannot help but feel that

the selective service program is not an entirely satisfactory means of maintaining

.. 7 an adequate force under present conditions.

Conscription should be used only

when other means and inducements are not meeting the quotas.
A man who is inducted into the service by the draft is there, usually,
for only as long as he has to be and does not reenlist.

And I don't know that

we can blame these draftees because no one is as efficient and aggressive doing
something they do not like.

Many talents are wasted under the present system.

What we want and need are career military personnel.

The draft will never satisfy

this need.
We want to make a career in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force
so attractive that most of its members will be there because they want to be.
am convinced that a military career can be made that attractive.

I

The recommen-

dations of the Cordiner Report recognizes the need and presents a reasonable
solution.

I firmly believe that the implementation of new incentives and an

adjusted compensation schedule Hill make the abolition of the draft desirable.
I believe also that now is the time to raise the IQ 1 s of the enlistees
and inductees in the Armed Services.

At the present time the Army requires a

score of 40 for all enlistees and a score of only 10 for inductees on the Armed
Forces Qualification Test.
action.

The minimum score of 10 is based upon Congressional

All branches of the Armed Services base their intelligence ratings on

the Armed Forces Qualification Test.
~f

Each Service is required to take 12 percent

their enlistees from those people who score in Category IV, that is those who

have a test score of less than 30.

I understand that a Category IV test score is

equivalent to a score of approximately 70 on an IQ test.
entire nation is

85

to 114.

The Average IQ for the

- 8According to information I have received from the Office of Education
the f ollowing table illustrates how the population of the

u. s.

stands on an

Intelligent Quotient basis:
IQ of 150 or above - "Near Genius"
0 , 1% of the population is found in this category.
IQ of 130 - 149
"Very Superior 81
3% of population in this category,
IQ of ll5 -129

"Superior"
14% in this category.

IQ of 85 - ll4

"Normal"
66% in this category .

IQ of 70- 84

11

Dull 11
14% in this category ,

IQ of 6o-69

"Borderline"
2% in this category,

IQ of 59 and belou "Moron, Imbecile, Idiot"
1% in this eategory.
This last category can be broken down still further as follows:
40-59 - "Moron"
20-39 - "Imbecile"
0-19 - "Idiot"
These criteria are adapted from the Stanford-Binet tests.

Although

the IQ average or median for the entire population varies somewhat, it is approximately 100 ,

At U?O
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The complexities of our modern weapons and instruments require a much
higher quality of personnel than ever before.

The simple fact of the matter is

that the Army, under existing physical and mental standards, has been required to

- 9 t ake too many men with low mentalities to perform the highly complex and extremely
important assignments that

ha~e

been imposed on the Army.

The other services are

not forced to take in inductees so they have been able to establish somewhat
higher standardso

I think it is time that the intelligence requirement s for the

Armed Forces be raised to a more realistic standard.
In Fiscal Year 1957 of

179~000

individuals inducted, approximately

63,300 were Mental Group IV-- the lowest IQ group.

26,700 of these failed to

meet current minimum aptitude requirements for trainingo

Non-productive

expenditures occasioned by t heir discharge will exceed $69 milliono These cost
figures do not include intolerable waste in training time and materialD

Mr. President, the House passed in the last session legislation,
H ~R.

8850, which is now pending before the

Se~ate

Armed Services Committee

giving the President somewhat broader authority, except !n time of war or
national emergency declared by the Congress, to defer from training and service
in the Armed Forces persons whose induction would tend to produce an excess of
persons with similar qualifications in certain categories.

The President would

have the power to modify these standards.
This legislation would improve the present situation and I hope that
the Senate Committee on Armed Services will consider this legislation at an early
date. When we are attempting to improve the caliber of our Armed Forces, we
should give them an opportunity to select men on somewhat higher standards than
those that now prevail.
Y~.

President, national survival is the most Vital issue confronting us

in the nuclear age. We therefore must have a highly skilled and efficient Armed
Force.

This is Vital to the interests of the taxpayers and the entire Nation.
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Mr. President, I wish to restate that it is my belief that these topqu.ality officers and enlisted pe:r·sor.nel cannot be retained wit hout offerl:1g
genuine incentives and these things are provided for in the Cordiner
In conclusion,

-~he

Report~

following is a SUIIl.l-nary of the highlights of the

3 speeches I have made on the defense establishment:
1)
a.~ed

The power of Congress to prescriba roles and missions

forces must remain

'dt~

fo~

tne

the Congrass and not be transferred to the

Executive.
2)
s~pe~ior

The collective judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a

mechanism than would ce the creation of a single

ch~ef

of staff or

principal military advisor to the President?
3)

T~e

number of assistant

secretaries ~

t heir assistlli>ts,

co~ssions

and committees in the Pentagon should be red-uced d:.•astically and the civilian
Qureaucracy in the Department of Defense should be overhauled.

4)

~he

Cordiner Report or something

appro~mating

it should be

adopted a

5) The

min~nwm

IQ's of all enlistees and inductees should be

raised to a more realistic standard.
6)

If the Cordiner Report, or s o~e thing similar to it, is adopted,

the draft should be abol::.shed.

